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ABSTRACT 
The legacy of apartheid may be likened to a Hydra. This mythical beast was rumoured to be 
large in stature, with poisonous breath. However, the trait it was better known for was that it 
possessed many heads and for every one head that was cut off, two would grow in its place. 
The elimination of the apartheid system effectively cut off the head of this hydra, severely 
wounding the beast but giving birth to various other terrors. Public sector corruption is one of 
those terrors. 
As an individual who was too young to be a part of the battle against apartheid, I have 
recognised that there is still a battle that needs to be won. As corruption continually thwarts 
the efforts of those who died for the liberation of South Africa and hinders the upliftment and 
development of the State, it becomes necessary to combat this scourge. However, before 
going into battle one must first understand the battle arena. Thus, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to gain understanding as to how the South African Government has attempted 
to combat corruption by means of policy and legislation. The information gained during this 
process may be used to identify areas of weakness, which may be considered in re-
strategising anti-corruption efforts. This battle against corruption needs to include all South 
Africans as public sector corruption has a negative impact on all who find themselves within 
our boarders. Thus, we cannot call ourselves truly liberated before this enemy of good 
governance is defeated. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
South Africa, as a relatively new democracy, constantly grapples with high levels of 
perceived and actual corruption within its public sector. Plainly put, corruption may be 
perceived as dishonest or fraudulent conduct and abuse of power by those acting within the 
public sphere for self-benefit, or for the benefit of others.
1
 All three spheres of government 
(national, provincial and local government) have had various attempts at combating 
corruption but have not as yet been able to eradicate this from the public sector.
2
 National 
government has been very active in enacting anti-corruption legislation. The Public Service 
Commission has reported that despite the provision of appropriate laws and regulations, cases 
of corruption are being reported at a provincial level;
3
 however, local government is seen as 
the weakest link with the majority of municipalities failing to receive clean audits, indicating 
the rifeness of corruption, fraud and maladministration.
4
 
The Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 is a survey of 176 countries to ascertain the levels of 
perceived public sector corruption within each of those countries.
5
 On a score of zero to one-
hundred (0 – 100), with 0 being ‘Highly Corrupt’ and 100 being ‘Very Clean’, the survey 
showed South Africa being ranked 69
th
 with a score of 43. According to this survey, the fact 
that South Africa scored below 50 shows the lacking in transparency and accountability 
within the public sector and high levels of perceived corruption.  
The media has reported that corruption cost the taxpayer nearly one billion rand in the 2011–
2012 financial year in South Africa. This has both a direct and indirect negative effect on the 
delivery of services by Government.
6
 Investigations into various spheres of government have 
                                                     
1
 SADC Protocol Against Corruption, art 1; Section 3 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act. 
2
 Section 40(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
3
 Public Service Commission ‘Report on Financial Misconduct for the 2009/2010 Financial Year’ available at 
www.corruptionwatch.org.za/sites/default/files/Report%20on%20the%20Financial%20Misconduct.pdf 
(accessed 21 November 2013). 
4
 ‘Local government the weakest link’ available at 
http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/content/%E2%80%98local-government-weakest-link%E2%80%99 
(accessed 21 November 2013). 
5
 ‘Transparency International’ available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publications (accessed 21 
November 2013). 
6
 Maswanganyi N ‘Officials ‘let off’ as public service theft nears R1bn’ Business Day 2 May 2013 available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2013/05/02/officials-let-off-as-public-service-theft-nears-r1bn (accessed 21 
November 2013). 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
indicated instances of highly irregular spending and maladministration,
7
 public officials being 
charged with several counts of corruption and fraud,
8
 and considerable financial loss being 
suffered by the people of South Africa as a result of this. 
Under these circumstances the South African Government has attempted the implementation 
of various measures dedicated towards combating corruption. This includes the ratification of 
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption on the 22
nd
 of November 2004, protecting 
whistle-blowers by means of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 (PDA), preventing 
monetary fraud by means of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA), and 
fighting corruption by means of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 
of 2004 (PRECCA). However, these measures taken by Government have had very little 
impact on the eradication of corruption within the public sector. Public sector corruption is 
increasing. 
According to a ten-year analysis on South African corruption, the Corruption Perceptions 
Index indicates that the State has obtained an average score of forty-six out of a hundred (46 
out of 100), never exceeding fifty-one (51).
9
  Thus, it can be deduced that regardless of the 
various anti-corruption initiatives in place since the country’s democratic era, Government is 
not winning the fight against corruption and its anti-corruption policies, laws and strategies 
are not evolving fast enough to effectively combat corruption.  
The National Development Plan has noted that public sector corruption undermines good 
governance practices, thereby hindering development and socio-economic transformation 
which is much needed, given the South African context.
10
 Public officials need to account to 
the people and maintain high standards of professional ethics so that the poorest people in the 
country do not have to suffer due to corrupt activities that result in non-delivery of services. 
Perceived corruption has resulted in strike action taken by citizens to demand that the 
                                                     
7
 ‘Probe into eThekwini a wake-up call – Mayor’ News 24 8 February 2012 available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Probe-into-eThekwini-a-wake-up-call-mayor-20120208 (accessed 
21 November 2013). 
8
 Evans S ‘ANC says it won’t suspend John Block’ Mail & Guardian 27 April 2013 available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-21-anc-says-it-wont-suspend-john-block (accessed 21 November 2013). 
9
 Corruption Perceptions Index, 2003 – 2012 available at http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
(accessed 21 November 2013). 
10
 National Planning Commission National Development Plan – Vision 2030 (2012). 
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government carry out its mandate as a provider of services.
11
 Some of these strikes have 
turned violent with potential harm to innocent bystanders.
12
 
Given this information, it becomes clearer as to why South Africa has needed constant 
evolution in combating corruption. Such evolution would be achieved most effectively 
through first understanding why past anti-corruption initiatives have fallen short in achieving 
their goals. The problem the country faces and which this research seeks to address is that 
despite all these initiatives, corruption has continued to rise. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research paper seeks to answer the following questions with regard to South African 
anti-corruption initiatives. 
How has South Africa’s approach towards combating corruption been developed over the 
past twenty years? More specifically, what has been the character of the various anti-
corruption initiatives within this time period? Have they shown tendencies of consistency or 
evolution in approach? If there were changes, why did the system evolve in this particular 
way? 
 
3. ARGUMENT 
As corruption became more prevalent throughout organs of the public sector, such as the 
South African Police Service (SAPS),
13
 Government developed three approaches to 
combating this scourge within its first four democratic presidencies. First, anti-corruption 
initiatives were based on the criminal justice system. Thus, corrupt acts could result in the 
prosecution of the accused. Second, agencies like the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) 
provided the State with civil law means of recovering assets lost due to corrupt activity.
14
 The 
Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT) and the Special Anti-Corruption Unit (SACU) are 
examples of governmental agencies which were designed to support the corruption 
                                                     
11
 Bauer N ‘Zamdela residents vow to fight on in Sasolburg’ Mail & Guardian available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-01-23-00-zamdela-residents-vow-to-fight-on (accessed 21 November 2013). 
12
 ‘DA youth leader’s shack torched’ ENCA 1 July 2013 available at http://www.enca.com/south-africa/da-
youth-leader-goes-hiding (accessed 21 November 2013). 
13
 Newham (2002) 3. 
14
 Special Investigating Unit and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996. 
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combating mandate of the SIU.
15
 Third, Government sought to eradicate corruption by 
instituting internal policies which created penalties for the corrupt. Disclosing the names of 
the corrupt became a means of deterring future acts of corruption.
16
 
Despite these efforts by the State it becomes noticeable how these various anti-corruption 
measures were implemented selectively and inconsistently.
17
 Such selective enforcement of 
anti-corruption law would do little for Government’s efforts towards realising a resilient anti-
corruption system based on accountability and transparency.
18
 This dissertation will 
periodically track the development of South Africa’s anti-corruption initiatives. It will be 
argued that despite the current extensive framework in place that corruption has thrived due 
to a lack of effective implementation of anti-corruption initiatives, and the lack of political 
will to ensure the elimination of corruption. 
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In accounting for the published works on corruption within South Africa this literature review 
will categorise the writings of other authors on this subject under particular prevailing 
themes.  
Causes of Corruption 
In assessing the causes of corruption, argument exists which alleges that corruption is 
entrenched within South Africa, and is inherited from the previous, oppressive apartheid 
system. In a historical context, Ellis notes South Africa has a history of corruption which 
precedes its democratic era, as evidenced by the ‘Muldergate’ scandal.19 However, Lodge 
finds the apartheid system to have been too industrialised and coercive to make it susceptible 
to political corruption.
20
 Arguably, the democratisation of South Africa introduced the State’s 
susceptibility to corruption which prompted the need to institutionalise bodies charged with 
combating corruption, such as the Public Protector, the Office of Serious Economic Offences 
                                                     
15
 Special Investigating Unit ‘What do we do’ available at http://www.siu.org.za/what-do-we-do (accessed 21 
November 2013). 
16
 Davies R ‘Government to name and shame corrupt officials’ Mail & Guardian 24 February 2013 available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-02-24-government-to-name-and-shame-corrupt-officials (accessed 21 November 
2013). 
17
 Basdeo (2010) 389-390. 
18
 Chapter 14 National Planning Commission ‘National Development Plan – Vision 2030’ (2012). 
19
 Ellis (1996) 171-172. 
20
 Lodge T (1998) 157. 
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(OSEO) and inter-departmental investigative units.
21
 Others may conclude that corruption 
exists within the public sector because of the symbiotic relationship it has with organised 
crime. This relationship, according to Minaar, notes the need for further anti-corruption units 
such as the Investigative Directorate for Organised Crime to be put in place and for provision 
of toll-free hotlines for whistle blowers to disclose acts of corruption in confidence.
22
  
The new democratic South Africa also introduced great potential for corruption within 
governmental departments. Hyslop’s approach in this regard is to analyse the administrative 
and political legacies which resulted in corruption taking place.
23
 Thus, he concludes that 
nepotism, favouritism, and appointments based on political party loyalty created a platform 
for corruption within various governmental departments. Others, such as Fraser-Moleketi, 
consider the context of corruption in Africa and note corruption as being ingrained within the 
psyche of the public sector, beyond the individual, creating the breeding ground for corrupt 
activity.
24
 In discussing the social causes of corruption it becomes evident that many writers 
do not question the evolution of anti-corruption initiatives, and only vaguely discuss the 
means used in attempting to eradicate public sector corruption.  
Anti-Corruption Initiatives  
Joint ventures geared towards combating corruption saw the emergence of the National Anti-
Corruption Forum (NACF).
25
 Ramsingh writes on how corruption is a societal problem 
which needs to be addressed by all members of society.
26
 This has led to the establishment of 
the national anti-corruption hotline and the formation of the National Coordinating Structure 
with the authority to effectively lead, coordinate and monitor the National Anti-Corruption 
Programme. However, this article is limited to a discussion on the research on the causes of 
corruption and the factors contributing to its prevalence within the public sector. There is 
inadequate comprehensive insight into what other anti-corruption initiatives were in place at 
the time of the establishment of the NACF, and what prompted the evolution of anti-
corruption initiatives within this period. 
                                                     
21
 Lodge T (1998) 187. 
22
 Minaar (1999) 1 – Private sector crime such as drug smuggling, dealing in legal firearms and stolen vehicles 
is made possible by cooperation from actors within the public sector. 
23
 Hyslop (2005) 773-785. 
24
 Fraser-Moleketi (2009) 331. 
25
 The National Anti-Corruption Forum comprises of three sectors; namely civil society, business and 
government available at http://www.nacf.org.za/ (accessed 21 November 2013). 
26
 Ramsingh (2006) 1. 
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As corruption can take place in the workplace, various writers have commented on how 
employees are to be protected when making disclosures on perceived or real corrupt activity. 
Le Roux puts forth the theory that employees could be useful in uncovering corrupt activities. 
Here, the feasibility of the Protected Disclosure Act (PDA) is discussed in relation to the then 
Prevention of Corruption Bill of 2002, and the Labour Relations Act.
27
 The PDA, in its 
objectives, provisions and practicality, is discussed in detail by Vettori who expands on how 
the Act could be used to counter corruption.
28
 However, neither of these writers have a broad 
scope in discussing how the means of combating corruption have evolved or developed since 
democracy, and the motivations for that change. 
Sector Corruption 
Public procurement refers to a government purchasing goods and services which it requires to 
function and meet its service delivery obligations. Williams notes the need to eradicate 
corruption from public procurement and puts forth the measure to address this as being 
administrative in the exercise of discretion, regulatory in the provision for legislation, and 
social in the shaming of the corrupt.
29
 Excluding people previously convicted of corruption 
from public procurement processes is also seen as a viable means of combating corruption 
within this sector.
30
 Authors have relied primarily on the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA) and the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) in their 
writings. This limitation excludes the consideration as to how administrative, legislative and 
societal means have developed within this anti-corruption initiative framework. 
Corruption within the South African Police Service (SAPS) is not without controversy as it 
has been found to be the second most corrupt department in the public sector.
31
 Newham 
focuses on the SAPS Anti-Corruption Unit from 1996 to 2001, which was an internal unit 
geared towards the effective prevention and investigation of corruption within the SAPS. 
Despite its resounding success at combating the widespread corruption within the SAPS, it 
was disbanded and its functions were absorbed into the Organised Crime Unit (OCU).
32
 
While SAPS corruption plagues the public sector, writings on this topic provide insight 
                                                     
27
 Le Roux (2004) 159. 
28
 Vettori (2009)292-304. 
29
 Williams et al (2007) 342. 
30
 Williams (2007) 1. 
31
 Masiloane (2007) 47. 
32
 Basdeo (2010) 394-395. Further attempts at utilising bodies such, as the Independent Complaints Directorate 
(ICD), and Community Police Forums (CPFs) was not an overall success at curbing corruption within the 
SAPS. 
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primarily into the anti-corruption initiatives which affect the running of the SAPS, excluding 
a more developmental evaluation of anti-corruption initiatives within South Africa. 
The Government of South Africa has promised the people access to housing on various 
occasions. However, the roll-out of these houses is not without high levels of bureaucracy 
and corruption. Rubin notes that a sector of the population categorises government housing 
delivery programmes as being corrupt and prone to maladministration.
33
 Thus, despite the 
amount of time and funding fed into anti-corruption initiatives, the public sector is deemed by 
some to be rife with nepotism, fraud, bribery and corruption with regard to housing 
delivery.
34
 Consideration on how legislation, policies, and strategies were used to combat 
corruption and how these three means have had to evolve to fit the climate of corruption 
prevalent at a particular period in contemporary South Africa is research not yet thoroughly 
conducted within the context of South African jurisprudence. 
This research is unique in that instead of having a limited view on the causes of, joint 
programmes for, remedies for, or sectorial forms of corruption, it embarks on a broader study 
which considers the nature of the various South African anti-corruption initiatives for the past 
twenty years. It encompasses a study into how these initiatives have evolved over this period, 
and the reasons therefor. This approach has not been explored before and the author submits 
that this constitutes new knowledge on the subject matter of combating corruption within the 
South African public sector.  
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
In answering the question in each chapter, various sources will be consulted in compiling a 
comprehensive study.  
As the question presupposes the review of policy and legislation, the primary source of 
information for these reviews will be policy documents, legislation, and published strategy 
documents on anti-corruption from 1994 to 2013. 
                                                     
33
 Rubin (2011) 479. 
34
 Rubin (2011) 483. 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
In addition, the writings by scholars who have contributed to combating corruption within 
South Africa, and various, reputable international opinions on corruption within South Africa 
will be considered.  
Furthermore, the author will consider the positions of various South African independent 
bodies on corruption within South Africa as well as newspaper articles. Examples of these 
independent bodies include the Independent Complaints Directorate, the Office of the Public 
Protector and the Public Service Commission. 
 
6. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapter 2: 1994 – 1998 – The development of anti-corruption initiatives within the Mandela 
administration will be considered. An evaluation on the nature of these initiatives and the 
reasons for its evolution will be uncovered and explored. 
Chapter 3: 1999 – 2003 – The Mbeki Administration saw great development in terms of anti-
corruption policy, strategy and legislation. This will be unravelled when discussing how these 
measures were implemented, and what prompted the further development of anti-corruption 
measures by Government. 
Chapter 4: 2004 – 2008 – The Mbeki/Motlanthe presidency noted great efforts by various 
organs of the State in combating corruption. Within this period political corruption will be 
explored as a matter of substantial concern.  
Chapter 5: 2009 – 2013 – The Zuma administration period has been under scrutiny with 
regard to the increase in perceived public sector corruption. Nonetheless, important 
developments within the public service in fighting corruption have been implemented during 
this time. These developments will be explored in answering this research question. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion – Herein, the research question be answered by taking cognisance of 
the findings of the preceding chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2: The Democratic Government: The Mandela Presidency – 1994 to1998 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Presidency of Nelson Mandela represented a unique period in South African history 
where black members of society were granted a platform to engage freely in all areas of the 
State without the risk of arbitrary exclusion. Within this period the new, democratically 
elected government took its first steps towards combating corruption by establishing certain 
safeguards against this scourge within the public sector.  
Three aspects of corruption will be analysed in each of the four presidencies; namely, what 
the perception was of corruption; whether there were policy initiatives geared towards 
combating corruption, and whether those policy initiatives resulted in anti-corruption 
legislation. Overall, this chapter will explore the character of the anti-corruption measures 
within this period, and how those measures approached this topic within the Mandela era. 
 
2. PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 
Corruption may not have been categorised as an urgent matter during this period, but that 
does not indicate that it was not an issue which warranted attention by the various public 
sector role players. Perceived corruption within the former Transkei and Ciskei, now Eastern 
Cape Province, saw the formation of the Heath Commission which was charged with 
combating corruption. Writers submitted that three political developments seemingly 
promoted corruption within this period; namely, the decentralisation of State administration, 
the introduction of market values into the public administration, and the growing cost of 
political competition.
35
 The truth of these assumptions will not be explored within this 
chapter. Instead, the perception of corruption within this period will be explored. 
A study of the earliest findings of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) between the years 
1995 and 1998 shows that the global perceptions of corruption in South Africa favoured the 
view that public sector corruption was high but able to be managed and eradicated by the 
implementation of sound anti-corruption policies and strategies. As shown in Figure 1, the 
State scored an average of 5.36 points out of 10, and only once did South Africa’s score dip 
to below five points. Scores above five points indicate that while the perception of corruption 
                                                     
35
 Lodge T (1998) 161. 
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may be high there exist certain levels, albeit not high levels, of public sector accountability 
and transparency. Within this period the CPI placed South Africa in the same category of 
perceived corruption as Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea and Poland. This perception of 
corruption is further substantiated by Statistics South Africa’s Victims of Crime Survey 
(VOCS) of 1997 which noted that only two per cent of the participants to the study had been 
victimised by some form of corruption in the country.
36
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
While the rising issue of corruption is identified within this period, it would not appear to be 
a concern expressed within all organs of the State. The way in which governmental policy 
addresses corruption in a minimalistic manner supports this point. The role of governmental 
policy in the fight against corruption will now be discussed. 
3. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 
Policy initiatives within this period seemed to coincide with Government’s overall focus on 
restructuring the public sector. Combating corruption and the promotion of accountability and 
                                                     
36
 Statistics South Africa ‘Victims of Crime Survey’ (1998). 
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transparency were notions raised within governmental policy in brief and vague terms which 
did not comprehensively provide a framework on how Government resolved to tackle public 
sector corruption. This will be illustrated by reference to three unique policy documents 
researched and released between 1994 and 1998; namely, the White Paper on Transforming 
the Public Service, 1995,
37
 the White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public 
Sector, 1997,
38
 and the White Paper on Local Government, 1998.
39
 
The Public Sector 
The White Paper on Transforming the Public Service was a framework document which 
highlighted that the public sector was in need of administrative reform. The objectives of this 
White Paper were to identify the weaknesses and challenges within the public service, to 
provide broad solutions to these issues, and to provide a framework which Government 
would use to base future legislation on. Two chapters within this document – chapters 12 and 
15 – are relevant for the purposes of this discussion.  
Chapter 12 of this White Paper focused on the means of enhancing accountability within the 
public sector, both internally and externally. Internal measures towards improving 
accountability were noted within the paper as catering for more participatory approaches to 
decision making within the government, in line with delivery of services. External means of 
improving accountability were noted as taking necessary steps to ensure that parliamentary 
scrutiny, by means of a relevant portfolio committee, be provided for. External measures may 
also be enhanced by collaborating with governmental agencies such as the Auditor General 
and the Public Protector. All members of the public were to have easy access to information, 
irrespective of their levels of literacy. The document went further and advocated for the 
establishment of monitoring and evaluation processes within the public service, thereby 
ensuring that decisions would not be taken without due regard to their. Legislation was to 
stress that public officials were to uphold the expressly required levels of accountability to 
the State. Such focus on accountability has the potential of preventing corruption by instilling 
good governance within the public sector.  
Chapter 15 was concerned specifically with tackling corruption in the public sector. Here the 
government expressed brief concern over public sector corruption. To deal with the matter, a 
systematic programme was proposed to prevent corruption and punish the offenders. This 
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was termed to be the Anti-Corruption Arm (ACA). The ACA was a programme to be 
managed by the Public Service Commission, the Public Protector and the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) and to use these structures to tackle corruption. However, the paper 
did not go further in explaining just how the ACA would execute its mandate, nor did the 
authors use this space to advocate for new legislation to give effect to the proposed anti-
corruption initiative. It has also become necessary to note within this discussion that, as time 
progressed, Government did not implement a systematic anti-corruption programme. The 
question of the efficacy of this programme will be analysed in the forthcoming chapters. 
Human Resource Management 
Human resource management within the public sector was an important factor in combating 
corruption. The absence of a dedicated focus on human resource management made it 
increasingly necessary to ensure that those who formed a part of the public service possessed 
the necessary capacity to hold a particular position and had previously not committed acts of 
corruption. The White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Sector focused 
on enhancing the future of human resource management within the public sector. Amongst 
the identified key areas for improvement were two areas which are relevant for this 
discussion; namely, holding public servants accountable for their actions, and the need for the 
public sector to conduct its business professionally, transparently and ethically.  
These objectives of the White Paper were based on the principles of fairness,
40
 equity, 
accessibility,
41
 transparency,
42
 accountability, participation and professionalisation. Special 
emphasis was placed upon greater accountability and more competent human resource 
management within the public sector. The White Paper advocated for there to be no 
manipulation of the prescribed criteria for employment of public officials.
43
 Theoretically, by 
adhering to these principles, both poor and corrupt performers would be excluded from the 
public service.  
Local Government 
The White Paper on Local Government made reference to the ways in which corruption was 
to be curbed specifically within local government. In identifying that local government has a 
developmental role to play within South Africa, the paper argued that this role was to be 
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monitored and supported by provincial government. This notion was based on section 139 of 
the Constitution which permitted provincial government to intervene in the affairs of local 
government where, amongst other matters, it lacked the capacity to carry out its duties. These 
powers of intervention were noted as a means of providing a safeguard against corruption and 
maladministration within local government, where local government failed to prevent these 
social ills.  
This White Paper further argues that the codes of conduct which bind the actors within local 
government were to be developed and/or revised to prohibit corruption and financial and 
ethical misconduct. Furthermore, local government was to enhance its levels of 
accountability, transparency and good governance and, by so doing, enhance the accounting 
and financial reporting procedures within municipalities in order to minimise opportunities 
for corruption and malpractice.  
As policy initiatives were limited in effectively providing for the establishment of a national 
anti-corruption policy framework, it is important to note whether legislation has filled this 
gap. The development of an anti-corruption, legislative framework will now be unravelled. 
 
4. ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION 
Against the background provided with regard to governmental policy writings, and the vague 
petitions by various governmental departments on combating corruption, legislation will now 
be analysed.  
Within the five-year presidency of Nelson Mandela, the South African Parliament enacted 
more legislative measures which were indirectly intended for the elimination of public sector 
corruption than measures expressly designed as an anti-corruption initiative.  
Public Protector Act 
The Interim Constitution of 1993 introduced the office of the Public Protector as a means of 
strengthening constitutional democracy and of maintaining an efficient and proper public 
service.
44
 The office came into being on 1 October 1995. The Constitution of 1996 described 
this office as having the power to investigate State affairs on the public administration, to 
report on these affairs, and thereafter to take appropriate remedial action where it was 
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deemed necessary.
45
 The Public Protector Act of 1994
46
 (PPA) gave legislative effect to the 
already established office, and placed a duty on the public protector to investigate matters of, 
and protect the public against, intergovernmental maladministration and various other 
unlawful acts performed by those within the public sector.
47
 This was, arguably, an indirect 
means to combat corruption within the new democratic South Africa, by providing the State 
with an office designed to uphold notions of good governance as well as an accountable and 
transparent public sector. However, the functions of the public protector were to be deemed 
broad enough to encompass investigation into the commission of acts of corruption within the 
public sector, as this office has played a significant role in the fight against corruption. 
 
The Public Protector Act described this governmental agency as being an investigative body 
geared towards uncovering the truth in matters of alleged corruption and maladministration 
within the government or any institution where the State is the majority or controlling 
shareholder.
48
 This office would have wide powers of investigation in order to obtain 
evidence which would be necessary to determine whether the allegations with regard to 
corrupt activity were true or not. Such evidence includes the collection of documentation, and 
even the calling of witnesses to present evidence within a particular setting.  
The public protector reports its finding to a designated parliamentary committee bi-
annually.
49
 Thereafter, depending upon the seriousness of the findings, Parliament may 
decide on the appropriate steps to take with regard to proven findings of corruption.  
While this office has been groomed to play an important role in ensuring that the governance 
of the State is not without independent scrutiny, it cannot be argued that this office may be 
deemed to be a direct anti-corruption vehicle. While investigating allegations of corruption 
may well be within its mandate, the public protector’s functions were not singularly geared 
towards the eradication of corruption from within the public sector. However, this office was 
effective in facilitating Government realising its desire for a public sector where good 
governance practices are realised. 
                                                     
45
 Sections 182-183 Constitution of South Africa (1996). 
46
 Public Protector Act 23 of 1994. 
47
 Preamble Public Protector Act. 
48
 Section 7 Public Protector Act. 
49
 Section 8 Public Protector Act. 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Special Investigating Unit and Special Tribunals Act 
The South African Government took a proactive stance against corruption when enacting the 
Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act of 1996.
50
 The Special Investigating 
Unit (SIU) was created for the purpose of investigating serious malpractices or 
maladministration within the public sector. The Tribunals were to be charged with 
adjudicating the civil matters emanating from these investigations. In this regard, the SIU 
became the custodian of good governance principals within the public sector. This was the 
first notable, governmental, anti-corruption initiative within South Africa which would 
operate within every sphere of the public sector. 
The SIU was the successor to the Heath Commission which was established in 1995 to 
investigate corruption and maladministration in the Eastern Cape Province
51
 and was headed 
by the then Judge Willem Heath.
 52
 The Heath Special Investigating Unit was appointed in 
terms of the Act in order to provide the machinery to tackle maladministration and corruption 
within the public sector in a responsive manner. The Unit would investigate matters from a 
civil perspective and institute action in the Special Tribunal. Criminal matters which arose 
out of these investigations would still have to be handled by the National Prosecuting 
Authority as the Act which created the SIU made no provision for the SIU to investigate 
crime or prosecute suspects. 
Section 4 of the Act spells out the functions of the Unit more comprehensively. These 
functions included the investigation of alleged corrupt activity, to collect evidence regarding 
the matters of the investigation and to present such evidence to a Special Tribunal. 
Furthermore, if such evidence related to the commission of a criminal offence then it was to 
be referred to the relevant prosecuting authority. Thus, it is important to note that this Act 
makes reference to both civil and criminal procedures as a means of combating corruption 
within the public sector. However, the SIU only come into operation in 1998. 
When the Heath SIU came into effect it used various tools in combating corruption. This 
included the use of internal controls and audits, linking with banks in order to trace funds, 
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and gathering evidence from informers.
53
 While the methods used by the Unit were not fool 
proof, they certainly provided the initial means for corruption eradication. 
Witness Protection Act 
The Witness Protection Act of 1998 was not a direct anti-corruption initiative but it provided 
protection to witnesses to a criminal offence, where they believed that their safety or the 
safety of relatives was threatened by another known or unknown individual, or a group of 
people.
54
 The same applied with regard to civil proceedings in which a protected person was 
a party or witness. Item 14 of the Schedule to the Act offered protection to an individual for 
any offence relating to exchange control, corruption, extortion, fraud, forgery, uttering or 
theft. However, the Act itself was not centred on combating corruption, but on protecting all 
witnesses to crimes.  
Public Protector Amendment Act 
The Public Protector Amendment Act of 1998 created a more direct approach which was 
taken by the public protector in investigating public sector corruption and 
maladministration.
55
 The amendment to Section 6 of the principal Act granted the public 
protector the discretion to resolve any dispute within its mandate or rectify an omission by 
means of mediation, conciliation, negotiation, advising the complainant, or by any other 
means which may be expedient within the circumstances. Furthermore, should the 
investigation reveal evidence with regard to the commission of an offence, and then the 
public protector was to bring this to the attention of the relevant prosecuting authority within 
the Republic. This approach goes beyond merely investigating corrupt activity, as was the 
status quo before the amendment. The office of the public protector would now have the 
ability to resolve matters of corruption within the public sector; and where the matter was of a 
criminal nature it would then be handled in terms of the criminal justice system of that time. 
This indirect means of combating would have the effect of advancing the South African 
jurisprudence on fighting corruption. 
With regard what is noted above, it may be concluded that the main and only direct anti-
corruption initiative instituted by Government within the Mandela Administration was the 
establishment of the Heath Special Investigating Unit and the Special Tribunal. Here, 
Government took an active and deliberate stance against public sector corruption. Upon 
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coming into power in 1998, the Heath SIU investigated each province within the Republic 
and recovered R6 258 010, 00 worth of funds which would otherwise have been lost due to 
corruption and maladministration.
56
 However, what is not evident from the reports made to 
Parliament by the Unit is how much money was suspected to have been lost to corrupt 
activities.  
During the first five years of the new democratic South Africa certain steps were taken to 
combat corruption. However, despite all of the preparation and thought that went into the 
planning of the aforementioned pieces of legislation for eradicating corruption from within 
the public sector, they lacked instruction on the manner of implementation. Thus, the absence 
of an official anti-corruption strategy which would have informed citizens on how to make 
use of the legislation set in place, could have contributed to a decrease in levels of perceived 
corruption within South Africa. While this may have had a negative impact on laws such as 
the Witness Protection Act, as individuals would not have been sure of how the Act would be 
implemented, other Acts which were not reliant on citizens as primary enforcers of anti-
corruption law would not have laboured under such hindrances as Government would have 
been directly responsible for their implementation. This does not, however, indicate that the 
government had not encountered its own hindrances in implementation of legislation. 
The strategy implemented by the public protector affords the office investigatory powers, and 
powers of adjudication. The Special Investigations Units and Special Tribunals maintain 
similar powers as well. The SAPS maintains its investigatory powers, but may not, as yet, 
internally adjudicate matters of corruption as the evidence of this could be used in the 
criminal prosecution of the perpetrator of the crime. 
While civil liability may befall the perpetrator of corrupt activity it is important to note that 
corruption is a criminal offence in terms of the Corruption Act of 1992
57
 and the Prevention 
of Organised Crime Act of 1998
58
. Thus, the collection of evidence of corrupt activity would 
result in the criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator in terms of South African 
Criminal Procedure. However, the SIU maintains its power to implement civil action with 
regard to the recovery of assets lost due to corrupt activity. 
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Therefore, the indirect strategies implemented by Government to combat corruption were 
premised, if not reliant, upon the criminal justice system. The SIU, as a direct anti-corruption 
initiative, called for the investigation of corrupt activity to be followed by civil liability for 
the perpetrator. As the SIU had no criminal jurisdiction to base its investigations on, any 
criminal prosecution would have to be instituted by the National Prosecution Authority of 
South Africa. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
South Africa’s initial approach to combating corruption within the Mandela era incorporated 
minimal anti-corruption policy development but saw various attempts being made by the 
legislature to form the beginning of what would later be known as the multi-agency anti-
corruption system of South Africa. With South Africa’s average CPI score being above five 
points during this period it may be argued that while perceptions of corruption were not 
necessarily too low, there still existed a duty for anti-corruption initiatives to take effect so as 
to guard against the increase in the perception of corruption. Whether these initiatives had the 
effect of improving these perceptions will be considered in the next chapter. However, it is 
accurate to say that anti-corruption initiatives within this period incorporated elements of 
criminal justice, civil liability, and governmental agency investigation. 
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CHAPTER 3  
The Second Democratic Government: The First Mbeki Presidency – 1999 to 2004 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When President Nelson Mandela declined to run for a second term of office, he was 
succeeded by Thabo Mbeki. It was soon realised by the Mbeki government that corruption 
was becoming increasingly present within the broader public sector. Government’s policies 
thus became more focused on the goal of curbing corruption, and anti-corruption legislation 
bolstered the legal support system in eradicating public sector corruption. However, 
consideration must be given as to whether these efforts had the effect of improving 
perceptions of public sector corruption or not. Police corruption became a matter of particular 
concern during this period,
59
 and this chapter will explore how Government resolved to deal 
with the matter. 
This chapter illustrates and compares perceptions on corruption, noting how they changed 
from the Mandela to the Mbeki presidencies. Analysis is provided on how governmental 
policy was designed to provide instruction on giving effect to anti-corruption efforts. Finally, 
consideration will be given to the manner in which legislation sought to address the desire for 
a cleaner public sector. In so doing, the author seeks to identify the types of anti-corruption 
initiatives which were given effect during this period.  
 
2. PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 
At the beginning of this era, corruption was recognised as a threat to the credibility and 
effectiveness of the public sector. Thus, government departments began to engage in dialogue 
on how public sector corruption was to be combatted, and how the various actors within the 
public sector were to act in combating corruption. Noticeably, political corruption also 
became a matter of concern when the then deputy president, Jacob Zuma, was implicated as 
being involved in a case of corruption.
60
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Transparency International’s CPI depicted a change in the international perception of 
corruption in South Africa. During the first two years of the Mbeki presidency South Africa 
maintained a score of five (5) points out of 10.
61
 As indicated before, a score above five 
points is not necessarily a depiction of unmanageable corruption within a state. However, it 
became evident that South Africa was on a slippery slope in terms of perceived public sector 
corruption.
62
 The CPI surveys from 2001 to 2003 provide substance to this concern. States 
which shared similar CPI results with South Africa include Malaysia, Costa Rica, Tunisia, 
Hungary and Greece. These surveys note how corruption perceptions increased as the State’s 
score dropped to a low of 4.4 points out of 10 in 2003, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. 
 
 
Transparency International was not the only organisation to recognise this concern. The 
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), which was renamed the Independent Police 
Investigative Directorate (IPID) on 1 April 2012, maintained its oversight function of the 
South African Police Services (SAPS) and the Municipal Police Services (MPS). In its annual 
reports which were submitted to Parliament between 1999 and 2003, the directorate noted the 
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growing concern of corruption within the police. The report showed that a lack of capacity 
and resources hampered the effectiveness of the directorate in investigating corruption.
63
 
Thus, it endeavoured to capacitate its actors by making provision for employees to attend 
courses on combating fraud and other acts of corruption.
64
 For the remainder of the Mbeki era 
the ICD held the issue of corruption as an investigative priority and sought to use the South 
African criminal justice system as a means of combating this scourge. By 2003 corruption 
within the police service constituted 10.5 per cent of all criminal activity alleged to have been 
committed by the police.
65
 
Various anti-corruption policy developments emerged during the second half of the Mbeki 
era. The departments of Public Service and Administration, and Justice and Constitutional 
Development were recognised as having made significant policy contributions within this 
period. The abovementioned developments by Government indicated one of two possibilities 
regarding perceptions of corruption in South Africa. The first possibility is that the 
emergence of a more direct and focused anti-corruption policy indicated the government’s 
natural progression towards achieving a cleaner public service. The second one is that 
Government recognised the increased perception of corruption and used policy development 
to counteract this increase. 
In light of these perceptions, a discussion will follow on how policy and legislation attempted 
to combat the growing threat of corruption within the public sector, and how the anti-
corruption initiatives of this era sought to deal with this dilemma.  
 
3. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 
The beginning of the Mbeki administration was greeted with significant policy developments 
geared towards combating corruption. These developments, such as the Anti-Corruption and 
Fraud Policy by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development would be 
considered vague in comparison to the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy by the 
Department of Public Service and Administration. However, these variants illustrated how 
perceptions of public sector corruption had contributed to the need to ensure that greater 
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safeguards are set in place. Three significant policy initiatives emerged within this period, 
and they will be discussed below in chronological order. 
Anti-Corruption and Fraud Policy of 2000 
It may be expected that an anti-corruption policy would be in line with the mandate of the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ).
 66
 However, this document did 
not provide clear solutions on how corruption, fraud, theft, and maladministration were to be 
eradicated from within the department and other branches of Government.
67
  
The two-paged policy expressed the department’s zero tolerance stance toward acts of 
corruption or any dishonest activity. In terms of the policy, suspected corruption was to be 
pursued with an investigation in terms of the law. Furthermore, preventative measures and 
detection controls were to be implemented to the full extent of the law. The course of action 
adopted by the department was to make all of its employees responsible for reporting corrupt 
activity, placing particular emphasis on this role being fulfilled by the management within the 
department and its associated entities. 
The policy took a proactive step in defining what acts were to be considered acts of 
corruption, theft, fraud and maladministration. These briefly listed acts provided considerably 
more insight into what constituted corruption and superseded the explanations found within 
the Corruption Act of 1992.
68
  
The topic of ethics was of particular concern. Setting standards of ethics with regard to what 
was expected in terms of business conduct was seen as a tool to be used in combating 
corruption. This expected code of ethics was set out in the policy document.
69
 Furthermore, 
the protection of whistle blowers needed to be addressed. However, this was done vaguely 
with a primary focus on these disclosures being made in anonymity. Thus, a proper 
framework on the protection of whistle-blowers is found to be lacking at this time.  
As vague as these principles might have been, they was a noticeable improvement in how 
Government prioritised combating corruption within the public sector. Although the 
sentiments were inspiring, little was done with regard to providing a much needed framework 
as to how these principles were to be implemented. 
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The National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) 
 
Nevertheless, 2001 was the year in which the government partnered with the private sector 
and civil society to combat corruption in a much broader sense. These developments in policy 
led to the formation of the National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF).  
The formation of the NACF came as a result of a series of conferences
70
 where Government 
engaged in dialogue regarding the elimination of corruption from the public sector. It was a 
resolution that came from the National Anti-Corruption Summit of 1999 that led to the 
establishment of the forum.
71
 Furthermore, business and civil society were invited by 
Government to make the NACF a collective action against corruption by all stakeholders. 
The forum was launched in 2001 and was meant to create national consensus on combating 
corruption by advising the government and other sectors on anti-corruption strategies.
72
 
However, this anti-corruption initiative suffered from complications that limited its ability to 
carry out its mandate. Business and civil society found it particularly challenging to 
coordinate its efforts with those ideals of Government. The forum as a whole experienced 
many delays with regard to how its initiatives could be streamlined.  
By the end of the first Mbeki administration in 2004, it was clear that the NACF was unable 
to play its role due to its limited budget and capacity.
73
 In effect, this unified stance against 
corruption by the government, business and civil society was unable to improve perceptions 
of corruption, as the CPI records an increase in levels of perceived public sector corruption.
74
 
The commitments made by these three stakeholders to stamp out corruption, and educate all 
persons in South Africa on how to deal with corruption, were not met. Positive results of the 
actions of the forum would only be seen from 2006.
75
  
This stagnation in South Africa’s progress toward realising a public sector based on clean 
governance did not necessarily indicate that other actors within the public sector would not 
maintain the momentum needed to combat corruption. The emergence of the Public Service 
Anti-Corruption Strategy also came as a result of the 1999 National Anti-Corruption Summit 
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which formed the NACF. The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) thus 
took up the responsibility of ensuring that every public sector department was provided with 
a strategy on how to tackle corruption. This strategy brought forth a recognisable change in 
Government’s stance towards corruption, hence, giving effect to the abovementioned role of 
the NACF. 
The Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy 2002 
The strategy designed by the DPSA came about at the time when CPI perceptions of public 
sector corruption indicated the growing problem that corruption posed to the public sector. 
Consequently, the department took to broadening the definition of corruption to include less 
obvious factors.
76
 This definition now included acts such as the abuse of privileged 
information, favouritism and nepotism, illustrating acceptance of the fact that corruption 
occurred within the public, private and non-governmental sectors.
77
 However, the policy 
noted these instances as not being a numerus clausus of suspected acts of corruption which 
may be investigated. 
The strategy proposed by the department comprised nine components, each one of which 
introduced a particular shortcoming of the public service, which created a breeding ground 
for corrupt activities. Solutions to these issues were presented by the department. The first 
component of the strategy proposed a review of anti-corruption legislation which needed to 
be strengthened so as to be relevant to the evolving public sector. The second proposition 
called for an increase in the capacity of existing institutions of justice, such as courts and the 
SIU, so as to ensure that these entities are in possession of the required tools to be effective in 
carrying out their respective mandates. Third, the protection of whistle blowers was to be 
catered for, and mechanisms for reporting corrupt activities needed to be made clear. 
Noticeably, the Protected Disclosures Act
78
 had been in existence for approximately two 
years by the time this policy was released. Yet, the public service still found that a more 
consolidated effort was necessary for protecting whistle blowers. The fourth element of the 
strategy called for the exclusion from employment of those found criminally guilty of 
corruption. It also called for the exclusion of the criminally convicted from contracting with 
the public sector so as to eliminate any potential future acts of corruption by these 
individuals. The fifth component called for the improvement of management policies and 
                                                     
76
 DPSA ‘Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy’ (2002) 7. 
77
 DPSA ‘Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy’ (2002) 11. 
78
 Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000. 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
practices within the public sector, and for ensuring that management at different levels was 
held accountable for failing to prevent corruption. The sixth component of the strategy was a 
call for the public sector to have coherent processes and mechanisms to manage professional 
ethics. This was seen as the key to combating individual intention to commit acts of 
corruption before they were committed. The seventh component called for a partnership with 
business and civil society in combating corruption. There existed a general agreement for 
Government to work with these stakeholders in this matter, as was agreed in terms of the 
NACF. However, this relationship needed to be strengthened in order for a joint anti-
corruption effort to be successful. The eighth leg of the policy was to have the public play a 
part in combating corruption. This was to be achieved by means of social analysis, research 
and public advocacy. By doing so, more insight was gained on how vast an issue corruption 
was and this informed any action taken by stakeholders in response to corruption. The final 
component to the strategy was centred on the ordinary citizens of the State. The strategy 
advocated for public awareness on the matter, and for the public to be educated on what 
corruption was and how they might play a role in creating a cleaner government. 
However, policy only provided Government with ethical guidelines on how to avoid and 
combat corruption. What becomes important in the efforts to meeting this mandate is for the 
law to place a national imperative on all three spheres of government, and the public sector in 
general, to ensure cleaner governance. Without such an imperative, any action taken by 
various actors within the public sector would lack the need to comply with this national anti-
corruption agenda. 
What follows the aforementioned discussion on anti-corruption policy will be a consideration 
on how legislation adapted to this changing climate of the public sector. 
 
4. ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION 
The new millennium saw the promulgation of three pieces of legislation which could have an 
indirect impact on combating corruption within the public sector. On 3 February 2000 the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act
79
 (PAIA) and the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act
80
 (PAJA) were adopted. These gave effect to Section 32 and 33 of the 
Constitution. The PAIA was enacted to grant access to State information to the people of the 
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country.
 
The Act provided guidelines of how this right was to be accessed. The PAJA sought 
to ensure that administrative actions taken by the State were lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. Furthermore, the Act provided all people with various remedies when faced 
with an unjust administrative action.  
Each of these Acts provided a means of promoting good governance within the public sector. 
However, while notions of transparency and accountability were catered for within these 
Acts, the levels of bureaucracy involved reduced the possibility of receiving immediate 
results on requests, consequently deeming the Acts to be less effective than ideally preferred. 
These laws provided an indirect means for all citizens to take part in combating corruption 
and maladministration within the public sector by granting the people means with which to 
hold the State to account.  
Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
Another indirect anti-corruption effort by Government took the form of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act (FICA).
81
 The aim of the Act was to combat money laundering 
activities within the State and to provide the framework for the establishment of a Financial 
Intelligence Centre and a Money Laundering Advisory Council. The Act provided these 
agencies with broad powers in carrying out their mandates. Thus, any money laundering 
activities within the public sector may be processed, analysed and interpreted.
82
 Furthermore, 
the agency was to inform, advise and cooperate with investigating authorities, supervisory 
bodies, the South African Revenue Service and the intelligence services in carrying out its 
mandate.
83
 
Special Investigating Unit and Special Tribunals Amendment Act 
The Heath SIU faced substantial challenges within this period, which resulted in the 
amendment of the original Act. Around the end of 2000, the Constitutional Court passed 
judgement on a matter which concerned the validity of the appointment of a judge to head the 
SIU. In the case of South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v President of the 
Republic of South Africa
84
 the court unanimously ruled that the appointment of a judge to 
head the SIU violated the doctrine of the separation of powers. Thus, a judge, as a 
representative of the judiciary, was not to be allowed to head an agency which exercises an 
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executive function. Maintaining a role in both branches of Government would create 
disparity with regard to the independence of the judiciary, and could not be tolerated.
85
 Thus, 
Section 3(1) which demanded that the president of the State appoint a judge of the SIU was 
declared invalid. However, this declaration of invalidity was suspended for one year.
86
  
Thus, despite the investigations the SIU was involved in with regard to serious malpractices 
and maladministration within local government, the provinces, national government, and 
State institutions, the agency found itself without leadership, which led to its ceasing to exist. 
However, this would not signify the end of the SIU as 2001 saw legislation being enacted to 
cater for the constitutional invalidity of the noted section of the principal Act. The Special 
Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Amendment Act
87
 amended Section 3 of the 
Special Investigating Unit and Special Tribunals Act of 1996 by removing the requirement 
for the president of the State to have to appoint a judge to head the SIU.
88
 Hereafter, 
President Mbeki established a new SIU by proclamation on the 31
st
 of July 2001.
89
 These 
disruptions had a negative effect on South Africa’s efforts towards combating corruption. 
Negative perceptions of corruption were raised during the time it took for the SIU’s activities 
to gain momentum.
90
 This transpired regardless of the many investigations pursued by the 
agency by the end of the first Mbeki era.
91
  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Within the first Mbeki presidency, criminal liability for the perpetrator of corrupt activities 
was a prevailing measure which remained in force. The continued presence of the SIU in the 
public sector meant that civil corruption investigation remained an anti-corruption measure of 
retrieving public assets which were lost due to corrupt activities. In recognising the threat 
against the security of public monies the FICA provided Government with more means of 
securing public funds and preventing corruption from depleting State resources.  
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However, despite these developments, the character of these aforementioned anti-corruption 
initiatives did not substantially differ from the manner in which corruption was tackled in the 
Mandela era. The system remained premised on criminal justice and civil liability being used 
as a means of combating corruption. The protection of State funds, the promotion of 
transparency and the administration of justice initiatives, however, provided welcome 
additions to the fight against corruption. The State’s CPI score reached a low of 4.4 points at 
the end of this period, depicting a greater perception of corruption when compared to the 
lowest point of the Mandela era of 4.95 in 1997. How Government responded to this 
perception will be explored in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4  
The Third Democratic Government – Mbeki/Motlanthe: 2004 to 2008 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The second term of office for Thabo Mbeki saw many developments in the realm of public 
sector corruption. The policy and legislative frameworks were further supplemented with the 
means of addressing corrupt activity. However, there is an element of doubt as to whether the 
public sector is capable of combating corruption when high ranking political officials within 
Government are implicated in corruption investigations. A more enthusiastic effort is noted 
by local government which began to design its own means for combating corruption by 
catering to a municipality’s individual needs. This period is also unique in that Thabo Mbeki 
would resign from being the president in 2008. The factors which surrounded his resignation 
are particularly relevant to questions regarding public sector corruption, and will be explored 
within this chapter. 
This chapter will provide insight into what the perceptions of corruption were, and whether 
these perceptions may have motivated the development of further policy initiatives. 
Thereafter the chapter will analyse how legislation reacted to perceptions of corruption, and 
whether this provided the public sector with further initiatives for combating corruption.  
 
2. PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 
The fight against corruption became a matter of particular concern within the second Mbeki 
presidency, as perceptions of corruption showed the vulnerability of the public sector. From 
2004 to 2006, South Africa’s score on the CPI averaged 4.6 points out of 10.92 Thus, 
regardless of the anti-corruption policies and laws set in place in the first Mbeki 
administration, perceptions of corruption demonstrated that these efforts by Government had 
not necessarily resulted in a cleaner public sector.  
The year 2007 brought forth a more positive result in terms of the CPI. South Africa obtained 
a score of 5.1 points out of 10.
93
 Thus, while corruption remained high, the proper 
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enforcement of anti-corruption strategy already set in place could have encouraged a more 
positive result. This victory would be short-lived as the State’s corruption perceptions score 
dropped to 4.9 points in 2008.
94
 Within this period South Africa rubs shoulders with other 
states such as Lithuania, Kuwait, Tunisia, South Korea and Italy with regard to its CPI 
ranking. Figure 3 gives the State’s CPI ranking over this period. The graph also provides 
information as to what these perceptions were when certain direct anti-corruption initiatives 
came into effect.  
Figure 3. 
 
In the Public Service Commission’s (PSC) Annual Report in 2004 the agency noted how 
corruption was a problem at all levels of government; particularly in the areas of procurement 
and the management of conflicts of interest.
95
 The PSC was of the opinion that in order to 
combat the high levels of perceived public sector corruption, the various role players within 
Government were to be properly trained and informed of the standards of ethics required 
within the public service. Thus, there existed a shared perception that levels of perceived 
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corruption necessitated an urgent requirement for all spheres of government to be proactive in 
combating corruption.
96
  
Within this period, the then Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 
recognised that local government was particularly vulnerable to maladministration and 
corruption. The department hence launched the Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy 
in 2006 as a means of providing local government with a framework policy on how to 
minimise the risk of corruption taking place at a municipal level.
97
 Various municipalities 
acknowledged this risk and sought to implement their own, individualised anti-corruption 
strategies.  
Political corruption gained much media attention within this period. The then deputy 
president of the country, Jacob Zuma, was dismissed by President Mbeki in 2005 after he had 
been implicated in the corruption conviction of Shabir Shaik.
98
 The State, in the case of Shaik 
v S, claimed that the relationship between Mr Zuma and Mr Shaik could be described as 
generally corrupt owing to mutually beneficial symbiosis, and that the evidence which linked 
these two parties to each other was overwhelming.
99
 These charges related to payments made 
by Mr Shaik to the then deputy president in order to secure his political influence for the 
purpose of financial benefit. Zuma’s dismissal would affirm the government’s position of 
taking swift action to guard against cases where its officials are implicated in corruption 
matters.  
This victory by Thabo Mbeki was short lived as the 52
nd
 ANC National Conference at 
Polokwane in 2007 saw Mbeki being ousted as the leader of the ANC, only for him to be 
replaced by Jacob Zuma. Thereafter, Thabo Mbeki became the first president of South Africa 
to resign from his post after being recalled by the ANC in 2008. Kgalema Motlanthe 
maintained the seat as president of the State for the remainder of this term.  
It was also during this period that Zuma was being investigated by the Directorate of Special 
Operations (Scorpions) on charges of corruption. The ANC expressed its intent of disbanding 
the Scorpions at the National Conference, which lead to the closing of this elite crime 
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fighting Unit by Parliament in 2008.
100
 The fact that the Scorpions were investigating Zuma’s 
alleged corruption may have been a factor which motivated the disbanding of the Unit.  
The NPA took a peculiar stance towards the new ANC president’s pending charges on 
corruption, which came as a result of the investigations by the Scorpions. After eight years of 
investigation into allegations of corrupt activity by Jacob Zuma, all charges against him were 
dropped two weeks before the next national elections of the country in 2009.
101
 Thus, there 
existed no further hindrances to prevent Jacob Zuma from being elected as the president in 
2009. 
This scenario depicts the notion that corruption exists at all spheres of government, and even 
within its highest ranks. This may be the termed as the ‘rot from the top’. It would also 
appear that while the ANC may have taken resolutions against corruption at its 52
nd
 ANC 
National Conference, encouraging ANC members and leaders to promote ethical leadership 
and democratic values, to avoid conflicts of interest, and to provide sound leadership to 
society in fighting corruption, that hypocrisy has limited the implementation of these 
standards among its national leadership.
102
 
The South African Police Service (SAPS) has also been affected by this so called ‘rot from 
the top’ syndrome, as is evidenced by the conviction of Jacob ‘Jackie’ Selebi. In 2009 Jackie 
Selebi, the former permanent South African representative to the United Nations, former 
Director General of Foreign Affairs, former National Police Commissioner, and former 
president of Interpol was found guilty of corruption as defined in section 4(1) of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004 (PRECCA).
103
 This came as a 
result of Selebi accepting R1, 2 million in return for certain favours.
104
 It has previously been 
noted that there existed high levels of perceived corruption within the SAPS, and this case 
illustrated how far up in the ranks this corruption was located. South Africa’s internationally 
high ranking police commissioner being involved in corruption of this level could do nothing 
but to cast a glum light on the type of service provided by the police. The Global Corruption 
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Barometer (GCB) reinforced this stance by indicating that between 2004 and 2007, when 
surveyed; South Africans consecutively found the SAPS to be the most corrupt institution 
within the public sector.
105
 Thus, with the credibility of the executive of the State in question, 
South Africa ended this era with higher levels of perceived corruption at a national level, and 
an apparent lack of enthusiasm for applying anti-corruption laws holistically and without fear 
of favour. 
Given these perceptions it becomes important to analyse how Government responded to 
dealing with this issue within all spheres. What will follow this discussion is a review of the 
various policy and legislative developments within South Africa that are geared towards 
combating corruption, with particular attention being paid to the steps taken by local 
government to deal with this pressing issue. 
 
3. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 
Within the dimension of combating corruption, the national government and its various 
departments were at the forefront of policy design and implementation of legislation. It 
became necessary for those policy and legislative initiatives to find application within all 
spheres of government. Local government also joined the anti-corruption pursuit within this 
period. 
Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy 
Various municipalities in different provinces of the Republic took to designing anti-
corruption policies more tailored to the good governance needs of that specific municipality. 
The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality,
106
 Frances Baard District Municipality,
107
 
eThekwini Local Municipality,
108
 and Ubuntu Local Municipality provide examples of how 
local government has attempted to incorporate national anti-corruption policy into its own 
domain. Furthermore, within this period, the DPLG launched its own Local Government 
Anti-Corruption Strategy in an attempt at promoting good governance and accountability 
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within provincial and local government.
109
 The point of departure for this discussion will be 
an analysis of the strategy by the DPLG; thereafter, the discussion will progress to how local 
government sought to localise strategy and other policies and laws for combating corruption. 
In recognising that municipalities had anti-corruption and fraud policies in place, the then 
DPLG realised that these local government initiatives had proven to be inadequate in 
effectively combating corruption.
110
 In that light, the department designed its strategy as a 
means of providing local government with holistic guidelines for procedures and mechanisms 
to be set in place in the promotion of good governance and accountability. This initiative 
came as a result of Government’s recognition of actual and perceived corruption within the 
public sector.  
The strategy had three particular areas of focus; namely, a focus on the local government as 
the primary organisation, a focus on the employees within local government, and a focus on 
the various stakeholders. With regard to the organisation of local government, the strategy 
sought to provide guidance on the effective implementation of the code of conduct for 
councillors and employees, as may be found within Schedules 1 and 2 of the Systems Act.
111
 
Furthermore the strategy sought the proper implementation of local government’s financial 
policy requirements, and sound internal controls against the commission of corrupt 
activity.
112
 With regard to the employees within local government, the strategy called for 
employment vetting procedures to be stricter and for employee induction programmes to be 
used as a means of promoting good governance within the municipality. The success of this 
strategy was also dependent upon all stakeholders to this sphere of government joining 
Government’s collective effort to combat corruption.113 
There existed two noticeable shortfalls of this strategy which may have contributed to a lax 
effort by local government in combating corruption. First, the national government did not 
make this national strategy binding upon local government, and in not doing so it had also 
                                                     
109
 Department of Provincial and Local Government ‘Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy’ available at 
http://www.cogta.gov.za/index.php/documents/doc_download/35-local-government-anti-corruption-
strategy.html (accessed 21 November 2013). 
110
 DPLG ‘Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy’ 2. 
111
 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
112
 DPLG ‘Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy’ 4. 
113
 DPLG ‘Local Government Anti-Corruption Strategy’ 5 ‘Focus on other Stakeholders –  
 The councillors; 
 The community; 
 Trading partners; 
 Employee representative organisations; and 
 SALGA.’ 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
failed to put in place sanctions on municipalities who deviated from the national standard. 
Second, there was no express intergovernmental supervision designed to ensure the 
implementation of the strategy.  
Local government was left with the options of either interpreting these provisions in its own 
unique manner, or of not implementing anti-corruption measures at all. The strategy sought to 
encourage actors within local government to report fraud and corruption in exchange for 
security from victimisation. However, apart from the Protected Disclosures Act and the 
National Anti-Corruption Hotline of the NACF, there was limited application of these 
national standards into the realm of local government. Remarkably, since coming into being 
in 2004, this anti-corruption initiative has been an excellent tool used in the recovery of 
millions of rands, which may otherwise have been lost due to corruption.
114
 
Local government maintained a few primary themes in its attempt at dealing with corruption 
internally. Certain municipalities based their policies on five recognisable themes. First, these 
municipalities would take a zero-tolerance stance to all forms of corruption within local 
government. Second, these policies included frameworks for the investigation of alleged 
corruption, and for all investigations to be in line with anti-corruption law. Third, these 
policies contained procedures on the reporting of corrupt activity and for the protection of 
whistle blowers. Fourth, raising awareness on the topic of corruption was prioritised within 
these policies. Finally, these policies also called for the proper enforcement of the codes of 
conduct for employees and councillors within local government. 
Whether or not these policies achieved their mandates cannot be said for certain, but the anti-
corruption policy by the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality was negated by strong 
perceptions of corruption and maladministration which transpired after the implementation of 
its policy.
115
 However, what can be noted is that an average CPI score of 4.7 points, between 
2004 and 2008 indicates a potential inefficacy of the strategies implemented thus far by 
Government. What is noticeable with regard to anti-corruption law at this time is that South 
Africa saw a significant contribution being made by the legislature with regard to the legal 
framework for combating corruption. This will now be explored. 
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4. ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION 
The second Mbeki era saw remarkable developments in the legal framework regarding 
combating corruption. No longer was the public sector to be bound by the outdated guidelines 
on combating corruption as was found within the Corruption Act of 1992. Instead, 
Government introduced stronger sanctions against the convicted with far reaching effects into 
their livelihood.  
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
Section 36 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004 (PRECCA) 
repealed the Corruption Act of 1992.
116
 The PRECCA sought to provide for the strengthening 
of anti-corruption measures, to provide for the criminalisation of corrupt activities, to provide 
for the investigation of matters of corruption, and to provide for the extraterritorial 
application of the Act in combating corruption. A significant addition to the anti-corruption 
legal framework was the duty to report corrupt activities, placed upon particular 
individuals.
117
 
Chapter 2 of the Act provides a broad definition of what constitutes an offence of corruption. 
This definition takes into consideration the direct and indirect actions of an individual which 
constitute corrupt activities,
118
 and the levels of differentiation with regard to how the Act 
would apply to certain individuals based on the office, or status which that person holds. 
Examples of this include public officers, foreign public officials, agents of the State, 
legislative organs, judicial officers, and members of the prosecuting authority.
119
  
It would appear that the Act has specific application to the public sector, with little inference 
to the Act’s application to private sector corruptors. However, it is clear that all acts of 
corruption are to incur criminal liability regardless of whether the perpetrator is within the 
private or public sector.
120
  
One significant anti-corruption initiative comes as a result of this Act; that is the requirement 
for the Minister of Finance of South Africa to establish a register for tender defaulters within 
the Office of the National Treasury.
121
 This register was to remain open to the public so as to 
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supply the people with information regarding those found guilty of some form of corrupt 
activity.
122
 In so doing Government took greater strides towards ensuring that a notion of 
transparency was catered for within the public sector. Those whose names were placed on the 
list could not have their names removed for a period of five to ten years. Once a name 
appeared on this list that individual was to be excluded from any contractual agreement 
between itself and Government.
123
  
This initiative had the potential to bring greater levels of transparency to the public sector. 
However, due to failure of maintenance, such a positive result was not realised. Only two 
names of those found guilty of corrupt activity had been placed on the register. Furthermore, 
the register had not been updated since 2010.
124
 This shows a failure by this initiative’s 
Registrar with regard to exercising its powers.
125
 Apart from the aforementioned 
shortcomings of only listing two names of corrupt individuals it, must be noted that access to 
this register is dependent upon one’s personal internet connection. Those municipalities who 
operated under infrastructural constraints may thus not have been able to access this 
database.
126
  
Thus, the initiative fell short with regard to being an effective means of combating 
corruption. However, it is theoretically efficient in that if it had been implemented, the 
various spheres of government would have been supplied with the necessary information to 
ensure that those previously found guilty of corruption would be barred from doing business 
with Government.  
This time period saw only two other significant national legislative developments which had 
an indirect effect of combating corruption and promoting good governance within the public 
sector. These developments will now be explored.  
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Public Audit Act 
First, the Public Audit Act of 2004 was enacted to give legislative effect to the provisions of 
the Constitution which provided for the establishment of the Office of the Auditor General.
127
 
While the office had already been in operation before the Act came into effect, this piece of 
legislation further provided for clarity on who the Auditor General may audit and the various 
audit procedures to be used by this office. 
It is self-evident that the auditing of Government and governmental institutions is a pivotal 
means of bolstering good governance. However, these refreshed measures of the auditor 
general could not be viewed as a direct anti-corruption initiative, but as an indirect measure 
of combating corruption. These measures ensure that irregularities with regard to expenditure 
are detected and taken cognisance of by Government.  
Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 
Second, the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act of 2008 further supplemented the 
FICA by affording greater means of inspection and investigation by the Centre into a public 
sector institution’s affairs.128 However, these means of investigation were not directly geared 
towards combating public sector corruption but they would be effective in providing greater 
means within this system of law which prevents and combats various forms of malpractice. 
National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act 
As was noted before, the governmental agency known as the Scorpions ceased to exist as a 
public sector anti-corruption measure. President Motlanthe signed two Acts into law which 
repealed the various provisions which gave effect to the Scorpions. The enactment of the 
National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act
129
 and the South African Police Service 
Amendment Act saw the end to the Scorpions in 2008. The amendment to the Police Act also 
had the effect of replacing the Directorate for Special Investigations with the Directorate for 
Priority Crime Investigation, known later as the Hawks. Government also received much 
opposition from political parties for having taken this action,
130
 as well as from members of 
the public. These actions led to the Constitutional Court later declaring that the Act which 
disbanded the Scorpions and replaced this institution with the Hawks was inconsistent with 
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the Constitution,
131
 and Parliament was to be afforded eighteen months to rectify this 
situation.
132
 These developments transpired when the CPI recorded an increase in public 
sector corruption.
133
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
It is noted that while legislation and policy has reshaped the manner in which the public 
sector is to manage its affairs so as to promote good governance, the will of the political 
forces is not necessarily geared towards the same objective. Institutions purposed for the 
eradication of crime, such as the Scorpions, are disbanded, the SAPS are perceived as the 
most corrupt institution, and legislation fails at providing effective relief to deal with those 
suspected of being corrupt.  
Bearing the aforementioned developments in mind the author will venture into a discussion 
on how the State has sought to combat public sector corruption within the era of President 
Jacob Zuma, from 2009 to 2013.  
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CHAPTER 5  
The Democratic Fourth Government: The Zuma Presidency – 2009 to 2013 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The levels of perceived and actual corruption within the Zuma presidency created an 
atmosphere which would almost demand that Government exceed all of its previous attempts 
at creating a cleaner, more legally compliant public sector. The previous presidencies saw 
various attempts by the legislature at supplementing South Africa’s legal framework with 
means of counteracting corrupt activity. However, despite these implemented means, reports 
by the media suggest that Government had not yet been able to provide the country with 
evidence to support the notion of it having had much success in ensuring that democracy is 
protected from the abuse of power. 
This chapter will analyse the character of the anti-corruption initiatives established during 
this period, and will consider whether these initiatives differed from previous anti-corruption 
attempts by Government. This analysis will also take cognisance of what the perceptions of 
corruption were, and whether the anti-corruption measures of this period provided the public 
sector with some form of relief. 
 
2. PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION 
The era of Jacob Zuma being president of the State ushered in a different and potentially 
harmful perception on corruption within South Africa. With the president being perceived as 
corrupt, having been previously implicated as such in judicial proceedings, it comes as no 
surprise that the CPI shows grim results with regard to perceived corruption within South 
Africa. 
Not once does South Africa score above five points on the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) within the Zuma era; instead, this survey indicates a progressive increase in the 
perceptions in corruption between 2009 and 2011. In 2009 the State scored 4.7 points, 
followed by 4.5 points in 2010, and an even lower score of 4.1 points out of 10 in 2011.
134
 
Only in 2012 does the CPI depict some form of improvement in perceived levels of 
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corruption when the State scores 4.3 points out of ten.
135
 However, the score in 2012 still 
depicted the dire state of corruption levels in South Africa. South Africa’s CPI scores within 
this period placed it in the company of countries such as Lithuania, Malaysia, Namibia, the 
Czech Republic, Saudi Arabia, Croatia, Montenegro and Kuwait. With an average score of 
4.4 points, this period is to be recognised as one with the highest levels of perceived public 
sector corruption. The figure below depicts these results as well as when particular direct 
anti-corruption initiatives came into effect within this period. 
Figure 4. 
 
 
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development noted the urgency in combating 
corruption, as it hampered the good governance of the department.
136
 The perception of 
corruption within the department inspired the development of a three-pronged approach to 
combating this scourge. This comprised of bolstering staff awareness on the various 
developments within the realm of combating corruption, improving the finalisation of all 
internal corruption cases, and taking greater strides in vetting key members of staff.
137
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The various reports by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) indicated an increase in 
cases of corruption within this period. Given the increase in corruption within the SAPS the 
ICD took a proactive stance to combating corruption and cultivating a culture of human rights 
and community-centred policing.
138
 The investigations by the ICD sought to probe various 
types of police corruption such as the abuse of informer fees, aiding the escape of an 
individual from police custody, the destruction, sale and/or theft of police dockets, issuing 
fraudulent vehicle certificates, and the sale, theft and/or disposal of exhibits.
139
 The 
commission of these acts of corruption had a substantially negative impact on the 
administration of the criminal justice system. Thus, the SAPS continued to be an area of 
particular concern within the public sector given that the continued increase in corruption 
limited the effective performance of the police, and the desire for a system where the law was 
adequately enforced by those commissioned with that duty. The Victims of Crime Surveys of 
2011 and 2012 continually indicated that corruption remained most rife at the level of law 
enforcement.
140
  
The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) took cognisance of corruption 
within the public service. The department noted that the public service was very corrupt, and 
lacked those effective measures necessary to combat and prevent corruption.
141
 In 
recognising the increase in levels of corruption the department resolved to tackle internal 
corruption effectively in its 2012 financial year.
142
  
The media also reported on the perception of corruption within provincial and local 
government levels. The high level of reported corruption within the Eastern Cape Province’s 
health department was a further indication of how corruption could lead to a vulnerable 
public sector.
143
 Corrupt activity which totalled R300 million within the Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Social Development Department exacerbated these perceptions.
144
 The reported corruption 
within eThekwini Municipality further added to perceived corruption within local 
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government.
145
 John Block’s re-election as the chairman of the ANC in the Northern Cape, 
despite facing charges of fraud and corruption did little to improve perceptions of 
corruption.
146
  
The name John Block becomes synonymous with notions of fraud and corruption throughout 
this period. Block was the Chairperson of the ANC in the Northern Cape Province when he 
was arrested on charges of fraud, corruption and money laundering in 2010. The charges 
related to procuring water purification equipment for Kimberley Hospital from Intaka 
Holdings at inflated prices during 2005 and 2006.
147
 He also faced charges of fraud, 
corruption and money laundering relating to government leases awarded to a company called 
Trifecta which paid Block and others to secure lease agreements in favour of the company.
148
 
Despite facing these charges John Block continued to operate as the finance MEC for the 
Northern Cape Province, regardless of opposition parties calling for his suspension from 
office.
149
 Furthermore, the ANC’s refusal to suspend John Block at this time, due to the 
allegations of corruption against him, could indicate a lack of political will to have high 
ranking members of the ruling party sanctioned based on serious allegations of corruption.
150
 
This creates a negative perception regarding Government’s desire for clean governance 
within the public sector.  
With perceptions of corruption on the increase, and with various anti-corruption plans being 
formulated by organs of the public sector it begs the question as to whether this would 
prompt the effective implementation of previous anti-corruption initiatives, or the 
development of new initiatives which deal more effectively with the issue. Thus, the policy 
and legislative anti-corruption developments which transpired within this period will now be 
analysed, with particular attention paid to whether these policies and laws provide the State 
with the tools it needs to effectively combat corruption. 
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3. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 
In line with combating corruption, national government’s policy developments within this 
period resulted in the formulation of the National Planning Commission (NPC). The NPC 
published its Diagnostic Overview in 2011, wherein it outlined various factors on the need to 
eradicate corruption from all spheres of the State.
151
 This publication noted corruption as 
being a factor which undermines state legitimacy and service delivery throughout the State. 
This arises from weak good governance and anti-corruption systems and institutions within 
Government which are under capacitated, having insufficient oversight mechanisms and 
lacking true accountability. Furthermore, corruption is viewed as more than an institutional 
problem, but also a political and moral problem. Thus, the focus on combating corruption 
should include consideration on how to ensure that the actors within the public sector have 
express intentions to maintain a public service which promotes transparency and 
accountability. This desire triggered the need for Government to expand its views on 
corruption, and the need to formulate a plan which would provide the public sector with more 
certainty in its pursuit of cleaner governance. 
In 2012 the NPC drafted the National Development Plan, which provided the State with an 
analysis on how great a problem corruption within the public sector was.
152
 The NPC realised 
that the eradication of corruption and providing effective governance required all forms of 
short-term thinking to be in line with a singular mandate. This mandate should have 
considered more than how a particular ill was to be cured, but should also have given 
consideration to how an ill came into existence, the factors which informed the ill’s resilience 
despite various efforts towards its eradication, and the provision of means to address every 
facet of this particular ill in order to ensure that the proposed solution deals holistically with 
the issue at hand. The NDP recognised the need to fight corruption owing to the perception 
that it frustrates society’s ability to operate fairly and efficiently, thus limiting the prosperity 
of the economy and the economic emancipation of the people.
153
 This strategic plan by 
Government is unique in noting how the desire towards a system of governance which is free 
of corruption would be an unattainable dream without the political will to support the 
stance.
154
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The NDP’s vision was for the State to have a zero-tolerance attitude towards corruption, 
which was premised on four policies. First, there existed the call to build a resilient anti-
corruption system. This system was to operate freely and without political interference. 
Further, the NDP proposed that this goal would be achieved by the strengthening of the 
present multi-agency anti-corruption system, increased protection of whistle blowers, greater 
central oversight with regard to procurement contracts, and empowering the government 
procurement system.
155
 Second, the NDP called for greater accountability and responsibility 
to be portrayed by public servants. This required the proper implementation of the various 
mechanisms of managing integrity such as the codes of conduct of councillors and 
governmental staff, a financial disclosure framework, and supply chain management 
regulation.
156
 Furthermore, accountability is to be mustered by means of linking the liability 
of public servants to their responsibilities, and for corrupt officials to be made directly liable 
for the loss they have caused the public sector.
157
 Third, there was the call to create a 
transparent, responsive and accountable public service where information on the affairs of the 
State was available to the people, in order to provide the means for the public to hold 
Government to account.
158
 Fourth, the NDP called for the strengthening of judicial 
governance and the rule of law.
159
 This called for the law to be able to change and 
progressively adapt to the needs of society. Thus, court processes were to be simplified and 
made to be more accessible to all people so as to create a system which was deemed to be just 
by all people within the society. 
The National Development Plan has provided Government with anti-corruption goals which 
are to be reached by 2030. All spheres and departments of Government are mandated to 
implement policies which would see the desired success of the NDP being realised on a 
progressive basis. Thus, the only means of determining whether these individualised policies 
will bear fruit by 2030 is to track their progress, and evaluate whether the public sector does 
indeed see positive results coming from this national vision. However, the manner in which 
the NDP has dealt with corruption within this period is no different from previous policy 
attempts. Yet again, Government outlined the difficulties in combating corruption, and 
provided no implementable directive on how to achieve cleaner governance. 
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Local government continued in its effort towards cleaner governance by implementing 
customised policies geared towards combating corruption, fraud and maladministration whilst 
also providing municipalities with a framework with regard to how the policies are to be 
implemented.  
The Sol Plaatje Municipality,
160
 the Mafikeng Local Municipality,
161
 and the Lesedi Local 
Municipality are examples of municipalities which have designed their own internal anti-
corruption policies.
162
 Each of these institutions placed particular emphasis on defining what 
corruption is. Bearing in mind that the PRECCA has made provision for a broad definition of 
what constitutes corruption; these municipalities adopted even broader definitions on what 
constitutes corruption and corrupt activity.
163
 These expansions on the set definition for 
corruption are arguably designed to give effect to the context and environment in which these 
municipalities carry out their functions. 
Local government continued to note that corruption and corrupt practices have the effect of 
undermining the values and principles of efficiency and effectiveness governing the public 
administration. This has inspired the need for local government to provide employees and 
councillors with the means of preventing corrupt activity from within individual 
municipalities.
164
 Whistle-blowing was encouraged with provision being made to ensuring 
that staff and councillors were able to make protected disclosures without the fear of being 
targeted or victimised by those who would choose to have their corrupt activity remain a 
secret crime. Thus, these policies were designed with the intention of reinforcing existing 
legislation for it to have practical application in preventing and reacting to allegations of 
corruption at local government level. In maintaining the prevalent theme of zero-tolerance 
toward acts of corruption, local government has had various, individualised attempts at 
instilling practices which could protect the good administration of this sphere of government. 
However, designing and instituting policy which would not be strictly implemented would 
vitiate these efforts by local government. 
These assertions substantiate the notion that any policy, regardless of how well it is drafted, 
would be rendered irrelevant when not supported by a will to combat corruption within the 
public sector, by the actors within local government. Government also sought to supplement 
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its legislative strategic framework within this period. However, these legislative 
developments were minimal and provided little differentiation from past anti-corruption 
initiatives. These developments will now be discussed. 
 
4. ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION 
The year 2011 saw yet another attempt by the legislature at providing further means of 
addressing the urgency to fight corruption. However, this initiative was one based merely 
upon the successes of a structure which had by that time already been established.  
Independent Police Investigative Directorate 
The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) Act of 2011 came into existence 
based on section 206(6) of the Constitution which sought to provide for the effective and 
independent oversight of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and Municipal Police 
Service (MPS).
165
 Another significant function which was to be performed by this directorate 
was to launch independent and impartial investigations into identified criminal offences 
allegedly committed by the SAPS or the MPS, and to make certain disciplinary 
recommendations in respect of such investigations.
166
 Furthermore, the IPID was 
commissioned to investigate any corruption matter within the police, and matters relating to 
systematic corruption within the police.
167
 
Regardless of what this Act provided for, these functions had been performed by the 
predecessor to the IPID; namely, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD). Thus, this 
new directorate was empowered to perform nearly the exact same functions as the replaced 
ICD,
168
 supplemented by greater legislative certainty on matters such as the types of penalties 
for offences committed by police officers.
169
 Ultimately, this Act provided the State with no 
new means of combating corruption within the police; which was substantially necessary 
when considering that South Africans maintained the view that the police was one of the 
most corrupt components of the public sector.
170
 Here, Government was presented with an 
opportunity to provide a strong, active, and efficient means of fighting corruption within the 
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police. Instead, it opted to merely rename the ICD and repeat the functions of this already 
established directorate within the country.  
Judicial Matters Amendment Act 
The legislature continued along the path of reaffirming past anti-corruption initiatives in 2012 
by means of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act of 2012.
171
 Herein, the Special 
Investigating Unit and Special Tribunals Act of 1996 was supplemented with regulations on 
the litigation function to be played by the SIU. The third amendment grants the SIU the 
power to institute proceedings in a Special Tribunal against a particular party, and to present 
evidence in such proceedings.
172
 While the Act submitted other amendments to the SIU’s 
legislative framework it must be noted that these amendments have provided this initiative 
with no additional means of combating corruption. The SIU had been identified as a means of 
Government reaching its desires for clean governance, and it has functioned alongside 
various other anti-corruption initiatives since its establishment. While legislation has not 
provided for the greater empowerment of the SIU, it must be noted that the SIU has 
broadened its reach in the pursuit of combating corruption by incorporating the Anti-
Corruption Task Team (ACTT) and the Special Anti-Corruption Unit (SACU) into its 
framework. 
The ACTT was established by the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster to work in 
collaboration with other government agencies, such as the Hawks, NPA and Asset Forfeiture 
Unit in fighting corruption.
173
 This Unit would come into operation in 2010 and would 
investigate high priority corruption cases when more than R5 million in assets would be 
seized. The SACU was commissioned to investigate and prosecute senior public servants 
involved in corruption. Examples of these types of investigations included inquiring into 
undeclared business interests, officials performing remunerative work outside of the public 
service, and solicitation or receipt of bribes by officials.
174
 However, the efforts by these anti-
corruption initiatives have not been without fault. Parliament had offered criticism on the 
efficiency of the ACTT in investigation. Failure to speed up investigations and prosecute 
those found to be corrupt within the public sector, negatively affected the State’s efforts at 
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fighting corruption and cast a dull light on the effectiveness of the ACTT.
175
 The failure of 
these bodies in carrying out their mandate potentially weakened the State further by allowing 
the corrupt to continue to be active in the public sector, pending the possibility of 
investigations. What is evident is that the mandates of the ACTT or the SACU are similar, if 
not identical to that of the SIU; thus, the formation of these units within the SIU would prove 
to be no more than a bureaucratic means of a government agency redefining its duties in 
combating corruption by assigning some of its function to an associated body.  
Ultimately, the public sector did not receive any new type of anti-corruption initiative which 
had been tailored to fit the climate of corruption within South Africa during the Zuma era. 
Instead, legislation merely clarified, and reclassified the status quo with regard to South 
Africa’s stance on fighting corruption; namely, the criminalisation of corrupt activity while 
affording government institutions the right to deal with corruption internally.  
Public Administration Management Bill 
On 5 June 2013 the DPSA announced its intention to launch the Anti-Corruption Bureau as a 
single anti-corruption agency within the Republic. The Bureau would be established in terms 
of Chapter 6 of the Public Administration Management (PAM) Bill.
176
 The Bill noted that the 
Bureau would investigate corruption within the public service, protect whistle-blowers, 
capacitate internal disciplinary proceedings, and cooperate with other institutions and organs 
of state to fulfil its functions.
177
 The Bureau would cooperate with government bodies such as 
the ACTT, NPA, SIU, FIC and DPCI in carrying out its functions as well. While the Bill 
noted that the Bureau would perform the function of investigating corruption, the 
independence of such investigation remained in question owing to the notion in the Bill that 
the Bureau would be accountable to the Minister and not to Parliament.
178
 Regardless of the 
various factors which contributed to the desire to create the Anti-Corruption Bureau, it must 
be noted that the second draft of the PAM Bill excluded provision being made for the 
formation of the Bureau.
179
 Thus, the department appears to have abandoned its desire of 
creating a single and all-encompassing anti-corruption agency. Regardless of the good 
intentions of the department it cannot be ignored that if the Bureau came into existence that it 
would be yet another anti-corruption structure providing no guarantees of success. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Within this period there existed a continued sense that while anti-corruption policy and 
legislation bolstered those anti-corruption initiatives which had previously been set in place, 
the absence of political will in combating corruption may have contributed to an overall 
negative perception of high levels of public sector corruption within the State. Regardless of 
the many strategies which were formed from the inception of democracy into South African 
jurisprudence, perceptions of public sector corruption within the Zuma era do not improve, 
nor indicate a potential improvement as South Africa gears towards its fifth democratic 
elections in 2014. What may be deduced is that the State failed to effectively initiate a 
focused attempt at ensuring that the actors within the public sector were fully committed to 
creating a state within which good governance principles were promoted above one’s private 
interests.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades South Africa periodically sought to combat corruption by means of 
policy and legislation. The State established centralised governmental agencies charged with 
this mandate. The media played the important role of informing the public of suspected 
corruption, and society campaigned for the true promotion of good governance. With all of 
these positive anti-corruption measures set in place it is of great concern that the perceptions 
of corruption steadily increased between the Mandela and the Zuma presidencies.  
The object of this dissertation was to examine how South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts had 
developed over the past twenty years. This has included consideration of the character of 
these anti-corruption measures, noting the various contributions made by Government in the 
form of policy and legislation. In light of the anti-corruption policy and legislation which 
have been previously discussed, this conclusion will analyse the character of these measures, 
and the efficiency of these initiatives. Thereafter, recommendations will be made based on 
the aforementioned findings. 
 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES 
Government’s anti-corruption efforts which came into effect during the four presidencies 
were unique in character. At the start of the Mandela Presidency the Corruption Act of 1992 
already criminalised acts of corruption. Until the institution of the Special Investigating Unit 
(SIU) in 1996, criminal prosecution of the corrupt was the main measure used by the State to 
combat corruption. The SIU introduced a different kind of means (civil forfeiture) to 
combating corruption within this period. The recovery of assets lost due to corruption played 
an important role in government’s initial anti-corruption movement. Despite the contributions 
made by the public protector it must be noted that the combination of criminal prosecution 
and civil investigation framed the character of the anti-corruption initiatives of this period.  
The anti-corruption initiatives of the Mandela Presidency were carried over to the first 
presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999-2004). Within this period political corruption started to 
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become a matter of concern as the then deputy president of the country, Jacob Zuma, was 
implicated in the corruption investigations of Shabir Shaik. As a counteractive measure to the 
increase in perceived corruption, Government took to supplementing its policy framework 
with greater anti-corruption effort throughout this period. The formation of the National Anti-
Corruption Forum (NACF) represented a more evolved stance in fighting corruption with its 
attempt at unifying government, business and civil society in the pursuit of cleaner 
governance. However, the constant delays of this initiative coming into full operation also 
delayed potential positive results in combating corruption. Nonetheless, criminal justice 
means of combating corruption were bolstered with the establishment of the Directorate of 
Special Operations (the Scorpions) in 2001 which provided a more focused approach to 
combating corruption. The re-establishment of the SIU in 2001, due to the closing of the 
Heath SIU in 2000, merely reaffirmed the element of civil liability within the State’s anti-
corruption system.  
While these measures were applicable nationally it must be noted that local government also 
designed internal anti-corruption measures within this period. The provisions made for the 
adjudication of corruption matters within local government showed a shift in the character of 
anti-corruption initiatives where organs of state took a more localised stance to rooting out 
corruption internally.  
The Mbeki presidency (2004-2008) was marked by the dismissal of Deputy President Zuma, 
and the latter’s victorious return to power by ousting Mbeki as the president of the ANC. At 
first the firing of deputy president Zuma for his corrupt relationship with the convicted Shabir 
Shaik sent the signal that Government was serious about corruption in the highest places. 
However, Zuma’s election as president of the ANC, while a corruption charge was pending, 
cast a negative light on Government’s attempts at combating corruption.  
On the legislative front the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA) 
provided extensive definitions on what corruption was, and restructured the State’s anti-
corruption framework. This Act enhanced the criminal and civil character of the system, and 
provided support for internal anti-corruption measures. Thus, the character of anti-corruption 
initiatives did not change. However, the framework for making protected disclosures on 
corrupt activity received necessary support from the NACF. Further, more municipalities 
took to designing internal anti-corruption policies despite reported corruption at local 
government level. Overall, anti-corruption measures within this period showed little change 
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when compared to the fist Mbeki administration. Furthermore, the disbanding of the 
Scorpions may be viewed as a regressed stance taken in combatting corruption. 
The Zuma Presidency marked an increase in perceptions of corruption, despite some effort 
geared towards improving this perception. The National Development Plan (NDP) redefined 
how crucial combating corruption was, but did not contribute to the system of anti-corruption 
initiatives besides providing deeper analysis on the issue. Legislation provided greater 
theoretical support for the anti-corruption framework, but these measures did little in 
combating corruption effectively. An example of this would be Government’s stance in 
disbanding a very effective Scorpions unit and replacing it with a less effective Hawks 
agency. Arguably, the institution of the Independent Police Directorate was a measure of 
improving perceptions of corruption after the prosecution of the former national police 
commissioner, Jackie Selebi. However, the progress of the directorate is yet to be seen as the 
police have been reported as one of the primary corrupt organs of state. This period may also 
be known for the ‘start-stop’ character of its anti-corruption efforts. The Register for Tender 
Defaulters was intended to be a means of increasing transparency within the public sector, 
and ensuring that those previously convicted of procurement related corruption were barred 
from doing business with government. However, the failure to add no more than two names 
onto this list since 2010 limited the effectiveness of this initiative.  
The promise of creating an Anti-Corruption Bureau in terms of the first Public 
Administration Management (PAM) Bill of 2013 petered out when the second Bill eliminated 
the creation of this Bureau from its framework. The Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) expressed great desire in creating this single anti-corruption agency. 
However, this desire failed to result in the materialisation of this Bureau.  
The character of South Africa’s anti-corruption initiatives remained based upon the following 
factors. First, criminal justice was the prime composite of the anti-corruption system. Second, 
civil measures created the means for retrieving assets lost in corrupt activity. Third, organs of 
state localised anti-corruption law and provided internal means of combating corruption. This 
included the ability for these organs to initiate their own administrative and disciplinary anti-
corruption procedures. 
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3. EFFICIENCY OF MEASURES 
One primary question begs consideration throughout this period; namely, whether these anti-
corruption measures were effective in achieving their mandate of combating corruption. The 
continued increase in perception of corruption reported in the CPI between 1995 and 2012, 
including Government’s own recognition of how prevalent corruption was within the public 
sector, would suggest that these anti-corruption measures were not successful in their 
mandate. When comparing the perceptions of corruption within the Mandela presidency to 
that of the perception within the Zuma presidency it cannot be claimed that the State’s efforts 
showed an overall progress in combating corruption, as is depicted in Figure 5. The 
efficiency of these measures will now be explored. 
Figure 5. 
 
 
Since the first democratic government of South Africa the State took to constantly 
supplementing its legal framework with various anti-corruption initiatives. Legal measures 
had provided the State with multi-pronged anti-corruption powers. These measures ensured 
that the criminal justice system was provided with the means it needed to effectively 
prosecute those suspected of corruption. The civil law means of combating corruption further 
supplemented the criminal anti-corruption framework. Therefore, it cannot be argued that 
South Africa’s anti-corruption initiatives were insufficient for combating corruption as there 
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were so many avenues which government could have taken in eliminating corruption from 
the public sector. 
If these measures were deemed efficient in being able to combat corruption then the concern 
is why they have been unable to ensure that corruption is counteracted effectively. Arguably, 
a lack of administrative control by the State over these initiatives was a factor which 
hampered the efficient performance of national anti-corruption initiatives. An example of 
such failure would be with regard to the Register for Tender Defaulters which had not been 
updated since 2010, thus limiting its ability to be an effective anti-corruption initiative. Thus, 
any anti-corruption system which lacks effective administration cannot be expected to 
produce results. 
Another factor which continually thwarted government’s anti-corruption attempts was the 
lack of political will in combating corruption. Without politicians within the highest ranks of 
government dedicating their efforts towards the objective combating of corruption it cannot 
be expected that anti-corruption initiatives will be effective in fighting corruption. Thus, 
Government would be required to practise what it preaches by ensuring that those within the 
public sector, who are suspected of being corrupt, face justice. In so doing, the public may 
show greater confidence in Government’s ability to combat corruption, which may have the 
effect of improving perceptions of corruption within the public sector. 
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order for South Africa to move beyond the present negative perceptions of public sector 
corruption a number of shifts must take place. First, the State must be given recognition for 
constantly having improved its anti-corruption legal framework which binds the entire 
country. Supplementing this framework with more measures is not likely to have any 
significant impact. Second, Government is to comprehensively implement those anti-
corruption measures which have already been set in place. 
Third, in order for the implementation of these measures to be effective they need to be 
supported by political will within each sphere of government, and within every government 
department. Fourth, the public should consider whether those elected into power possess the 
required desire to promote the good governance of the State, and the will to pursue such an 
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agenda. Fifth, it is further recommended that Government must remove politicians who have 
placed personal gain above the duty to serve the people.  
Sixth, anti-corruption bodies should be strengthened. In this regard the independence of the 
Hawks must be strengthened, and the National Department of Public Prosecutions must be 
further capacitated so as to be more effective in its mandate. 
Finally, the public must take a more proactive stance in combating corruption. It is not only 
government who should be responsible for combating corruption, but the ordinary people 
should play their part by, for example, not paying bribes and not seeking to corrupt those 
within the public sector. A general public which is more geared towards the cleaner 
governance of the State would possess the means of ensuring that Government is held 
accountable for every act of corruption. No other stakeholder to the public sector has this 
much power to curb corruption, and this power should be exercised to its full extent in order 
to realise the goal of having a system of governance based on notions of transparency and 
accountability. 
The realisation of good governance practices within the public sector is not an unattainable 
goal. It requires a collective effort towards combating corruption. Thus, it is for all South 
Africans to accept that the stability of the State, the provision of services to all, selfless 
government, and the enhancement of the livelihoods of all South Africans is an objective 
worth fighting for. Accepting this may greatly advance South Africa’s fight against 
corruption. 
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